Investment under Liquidity Constraints * This paper presents a two-period human capital investment model of married and single immigrants under binding liquidity constraints, which explains alternative patterns in the host country's labor market. These patterns are also compared to those of natives who face a perfect capital market. By extending Eckstein and Weiss' model (2004) from the case of single immigrants with accessibility to a perfect capital market to the case of creditconstrained immigrant families, it is shown that the comparative advantage in investment that determines which spouse will invest more in local skills depends on his/her imported human capital growth rate rather than on its level. This comparative advantage can lead to full or partial specialization in work and investment activities within immigrant households. However, the level invested by each spouse is non-increasing with the level of the imported human capital of the spouse with the comparative advantage in investment, whereas it is nondecreasing with the level of imported human capital of the other spouse. A comparison of pre and post marriage investment indicates that the spouse with the comparative advantage in investment will increase his/her investment in human capital after his/her marriage, whereas the other spouse will decrease it. The more efficient investment due to marriage enables the achievement of a Pareto improvement. 
I. Introduction
Can marriage help immigrants facilitate binding liquidity constraints upon arrival to a new country by enabling an efficient human capital investment in local skills, thereby leading to a Pareto improvement? Do immigrant couples' human capital investment decisions differ from those of their native counterparts? This paper studies the optimal human capital investment decisions of married immigrants who face binding liquidity constraints compared to those of single immigrants and those of natives who have access to a perfect capital market.
The paper provides a theoretical framework for what is known in the empirical literature as the Family Investment Hypothesis (henceforth FIH). According to the FIH, credit-constrained immigrant families adopt a household strategy in order to finance their post-immigration human capital investment such that one spouse invests in host countryspecific human capital and the other spouse undertakes labor market activities that finance their current consumption. Binding credit-constraints thus create a link between the husband and the wife's labor supply.
Despite growing interest in the FIH, to the best of our knowledge, there is no formal model that explains the relations between the immigrant husband and his wife's investment and work strategies. The purpose of this paper is to fill this niche. As stated by Cobb-Clark and Crossley (2004) , any formal version of the FIH must address the household members' comparative advantage in work and investment activities.
In our model, assuming that the pre and post-immigration human capital are complements in their influence on the immigrant's earning capacity in the host country 1 , the household member's comparative advantage in investment in local skills emerges from 3 his/her relatively high imported human capital growth rate. The growth rate of imported human capital reflects the immigrant's adjustment process to a new-country economy which may depend on his/her imported occupation, country of origin, etc. 2 This comparative advantage can lead to partial specialization of one or both spouses or to full specialization within the immigrants' household.
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There exists extensive empirical literature that attempts to test the FIH. 4 The major aim of these papers is to determine whether immigrant's family faces and responds to binding liquidity constraints, based on the husband and wife's performance in the new labor market. Any evidence that the secondary worker in the family works more, works longer hours, and foregoes his/her investment in human capital by initially taking better paying but "dead-end" jobs compared to the primary worker was considered as a support for the hypothesis and for the existence of binding liquidity constraints, and vice versa.
However, this literature a priori classified the husband and wife as the primary and secondary workers, respectively, though this classification was not supported by any formal economic considerations.
4
of consumption between the spouses. The more efficient investment due to marriage enables the achievement of a Pareto improvement.
Comparative statics analysis reveals that a proportional change in both spouses' imported human capital levels does not affect their optimal investments. However, the level invested by each spouse is non-increasing with the level of the imported human capital of the spouse with the comparative advantage in investment, whereas it is non-decreasing with the level of imported human capital of the other spouse. These results indicate that any empirical examination of the FIH should also control for the investigated spouse's imported human capital growth rate relative to that of his/her spouse and not only for their imported human capital levels (i.e., the wife and husband's years of schooling).
Finally, the model demonstrates that one cannot a priori expect that the investment of native couples with accessibility to a perfect capital market would be higher than the investment of credit-constrained immigrant couples (other things being equal). Liquidity constraints indeed act to reduce the immigrants' investment in local skills, but the imported human capital growth effect acts in the opposite direction to augment their investment. It is therefore not surprising that researchers found that in some countries immigrant families invest more than their native counterparts, and vice versa in other countries. Specifically, the empirical support for the FIH reported in Baker and Benjamin (1997) for Canada and the opposite findings in Blau et al. (2003) for the U.S. can both emerge as special cases of our model.
II. The Model
In this section, a two-period model of the married immigrants' optimal investment in local human capital is developed. Following Eckstein and Weiss (2004) 
A. The Family's Earnings Possibilities Frontier
The family maximizes its inter-temporal utility. This requires an efficient production of the family's earnings regardless of the capital market structure. The family's Earnings Possibilities Frontier is derived by solving the following problem:
In the second period, which is the last work period, there is no incentive to invest on the job, i.e., 0
and thus 2 2 Y y = . Applying the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem for an interior solution to (4), the optimal first period investment policy is characterized by:
where ,
Equation (5) is equivalent to the following equation:
The left-hand side of (6) 
In the cases of corner solutions, i.e., along the edge, the following inequality is satisfied:
Given that w h β β > , corner solutions are part of the Earnings Possibilities Frontier under one of the following two conditions:
may lead to the allocation where the wife is the only spouse who works and the husband only invests (i.e.,
that the husband is the only spouse who invests, if at all, and the wife only works
), see Figure 1a , respectively. The case of full 9 An iso-1 y is linear, whereas the concavity of ) ( tj x g implies that an iso-2 y is strictly convex. Thus, the tangency condition is also sufficient for maximization of 2 y for a given 1 y . 10 Given that
.e. the family would always prefer to transfer money to the next period via investment on the job rather than store the cash. However, in the next section we show that the above assumption does not affect the solution under binding liquidity constraints.
8 specialization, where the husband only invests and the wife only works, may occur only if
The slopes of the Earnings Possibilities Frontier for the above-mentioned cases of corner solutions to (4), i.e.,
, are, respectively:
From the concavity of ) ( tj x g and from (6'), (7') and (7'') it follows that the Figure 1a) .
B. The Effect of the Capital Market Structure on Investment
First consider a perfect capital market in which every family can borrow and lend freely at a fixed interest rate, r , as a benchmark. Under a perfect capital market, investment and consumption decisions can be separated. The family maximizes the present value of its lifetime earnings: is increasing and concave. The optimal investment policy given by (9) is independent of the imported human capital levels of both spouses and of his/her spouse's human capital growth. Therefore, the optimal investment of each partner is not influenced by the marital status. However, the person with the lower imported human capital growth rate will work relatively more.
The possibility to lend or borrow at a fixed interest rate, r, may lead the family to consume at a different point than its production (earnings) point. To illustrate this case, consider point 2 B in Figure 1b that satisfies (9) and represents the family's production.
Utility maximization, however, would lead the family to consume at point C, which means that the family borrows during the first period (in order to finance the investment, at least partially).
Let * r be the interest rate such that under a perfect capital market the family will not borrow and will not lend, but will transfer money to the next period through investment on the job, if at all. In fact, ) 1 ( * + − r is the slope of the family's (indirect) indifferent curve at the point of tangency to the Earnings Possibilities Frontier (see point 1 B in Figure 1b ).
By definition, liquidity constraints are binding if the family would like to borrow in the market interest rate, r, but in practice it cannot do so. That is, the competitive interest rate r is lower than . * r Given that the family faces binding liquidity constraints, it must decide on a) the level of each spouse's investment on the job and, b) the partition of consumption (earnings) between the spouses. For an efficient allocation of consumption between the spouses, the utility of one spouse is necessarily maximized for any given utility level of the other spouse. In order to concentrate on the influence of marriage on the investment decisions, it is assumed that each spouse's utility is a function of his/her own consumption only. In addition, we also assume a separable inter-temporal utility. The objective of the family is then: 
The right-hand side of (11) is a necessary condition for any efficient allocation of intertemporal consumption (herewith -efficient allocation condition). However, without additional assumptions the two decisions (a) and (b) above should be solved simultaneously, i.e., each spouse's optimal investment level may depend on the partition of consumption between the spouses.
Lemma 1: If both spouses have identical preferences presented by a homothetic utility function,U , all the partitions of consumption (earnings) between them that satisfy the efficient allocation condition correspond to the same outcome on the Earnings Possibilities Frontier.
11
Proof: Assuming identical homothetic preferences, without loss of generality, (11) can be written as: Since the left-hand side of (12' 
Thus, due to binding liquidity constraints in the case of an interior solution, both spouses will work more (invest less). However, in the case of a corner solution, if the tangency points ( 1 B and 2 B ) are to the left of 1 E only the wife will work more, whereas if the tangency points are to the right of 2 E only the husband will work more. That is, under binding liquidity constraints, the family consumes and produces at point 1 B (where the family's indifferent curve is tangent to the Earnings Possibilities Frontier) instead of producing at point 2 B (which is located to the left of 1 B ) and consuming at point C , by using the capital market to finance the earning gap (see Figure 1b) .
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According to (9), under a perfect capital market, each spouse's imported human capital level will not affect the family members' investment decision. However, in the following section it is shown that under binding liquidity constraints the investment decision of each family member is affected by his/her own and his/her spouse's imported human capital level.
Lemma 2 See proof in Appendix A.
Given that each spouse has a different β , it follows from Lemma 3 that the effect of an increase in the imported human capital level on the human capital investment is asymmetric. Specifically, an increase in the level of imported skills of the spouse with the higher imported human capital growth rate leads to a decrease in the investment of the two spouses, while the same increase experienced by his/her spouse increases both spouses' investment.
C. Investment of Single Versus Married Immigrants
In the following section, we compare the investment in local human capital of singles and married immigrants. The optimal investment policy under a perfect capital 13 market (given by (9)) holds regardless of whether a marriage takes place. However, under binding liquidity constraints it is influenced by the marital status. In the following Lemma, it is shown that a single man who marries would increase his investment in local skills, whereas a single woman who marries would decrease her investment in local skills (recall 
. , is violated pre-marriage. In order to characterize each spouse's optimal investment relative to his/her investment as a single person, it is first assumed that both spouses have the same imported human capital level. The first order conditions for maximization of the family's utility will then be: 
The left-hand sides of (17) and (18) The inequality in (19) for the husband is therefore strengthened even more, whereas the inequality for the wife is weakened (recall that a single immigrant's investment is independent of her/his imported human capital level). However, the wife's inequality cannot be reversed, since her investment after marriage will never reach The wife's inequality in (19) is thus even strengthened, whereas the husband's inequality is weakened, although it will never again reach . * x The husband's investment therefore cannot be reversed.
D. Investment of Immigrant Families Compared to Native Families
Our framework contains two elements that distinguish immigrants from natives.
The first is that natives face a perfect capital market, whereas immigrants may face binding liquidity constraints upon arrival in the new country. The second element is that natives acquire only local human capital, and therefore cannot benefit from the exogenous growth rate of imported human capital.
Due to these differences, the optimal first period investment policy of native couples is characterized by (instead of by (13) These results are compatible with the empirical findings of Baker and Benjamin (1997) that immigrant women's labor-market participation upon arrival in Canada is higher than that of native women, and also with the opposite results obtained by Blau et al. (2003) for the U.S. Both findings may emerge as special cases of our model, depending on the value of the parameters.
III. Concluding Remarks
The present paper provides a two-period theoretical framework for exploring the predictions of the Family Investment Hypothesis. The optimal level of investment in local skills of an immigrant family that acts under binding liquidity constraints is characterized compared to the optimal investment of a single immigrant and native families that face a perfect capital market.
The findings indicate that each family member's optimal investment level in local skills depends on both spouses' imported human capital growth rate and not solely on their imported human capital level. The imported human capital growth rate is a special feature of the immigrants' adjustment process to the new-country economy. To date, the empirical literature on family investment assumed that the investment in local skills depends, among other things, on the absolute number of years of schooling, i.e., on the imported human capital level. However, it is not clear whether the investment in local skills of two immigrants with the same years of schooling, for example a physician and a physicist, should be identical (other things being equal). Immigrants with an identical imported human capital level may face different imported human capital growth rates, depending on the difference in the technologies between their home country and the destination country.
In the above example, it can be argued that the adjustment process of the physician's imported skills is more difficult than the physicist's. The absorption of these two immigrants can therefore be different despite their identical imported human capital level.
Imported human capital growth may depend on the imported occupation, the country of origin, the age at arrival, etc. 
